2014-04-29

Je diffuse ce jour la conclusion d’un article majeur publié en 1997. Je l’ai croisé au détour des références d’une relecture d’un chapitre de thèse sur «la crise en Grèce» que finit de rédiger Efstathia Antiochou. Je la remercie de m’avoir suggéré, par son travail, cet exercice de notre mémoire. Dans le contexte actuel d’incertitude économique sévère en Europe, aggravée par les menaces brandies contre la paix -pour nous faire encore BIEN voter et BIEN ratifier les traités-, les phrases de M. Feldstein raisonnent avec plus de force mais aussi en provoquant stupeur et émotion car en effet …beaucoup d’économistes connaissaient les risques et les incertitudes et depuis longtemps!

En voici un témoignage clair :

«Although the major countries of continental Europe now appear committed to adopting a single currency for Europe in January 1999, the events in the summer of 1997 show that this process may still be derailed by basic conflicts between France and Germany about the appropriate stance of monetary and fiscal policy, about the long-run independence and goal of the European Central Bank, and about the future limits on fiscal deficits. These disagreements about monetary and fiscal policies may have broader effects on the relations among European countries, creating conflict rather than the political harmony that many of EMU’s advocates seek.

The economic consequences of EMU, if it does come to pass, are also likely to be negative. Imposing a single interest rate and an inflexible exchange rate on countries that are characterized by different economic shocks, inflexible wages, low labor mobility and separate national fiscal systems without significant cross-border cyclical transfers will raise the overall level of cyclical unemployment among the EMU members. The shift from national monetary policies dominated by the Bundesbank within the European Monetary System system to a European Central Bank governed by majority voting with a politically determined exchange rate policy will almost certainly raise the average level of future inflation. The emphasis on common economic and social policies will reduce the scope for the experimentation and competition that would otherwise lead to reductions in the current extremely high levels of structural unemployment.

Political leaders in Europe seem prepared to ignore these adverse consequences because they see EMU as a way to further the political agenda of a federalist European political union, which will have a common foreign and military policy and a much more centralized determination of what are currently nationally determined economic and social policies. Although such a policy is often advocated as a way to reduce conflict within Europe, it may well have the opposite effect. Uniform monetary policy and inflexible exchange rates will create conflicts whenever cyclical conditions differ among the member countries. Imposing a single foreign and military policy on countries with very different national traditions and geographic circumstances will exacerbate these economic conflicts. So too will the inevitable struggle between Germany and France for leadership and among the other countries for a share in the decision-making power.

The Maastricht treaty contains no provisions allowing a country to leave the monetary union once it has joined. Membership in the monetary union and the adoption of a single currency is intended to be permanent. The adverse economic effects of EMU and the broader political disagreements will nevertheless induce some countries to ask whether they have made a mistake in joining. Although a sovereign country could in principle withdraw from the EMU, the potential trade sanctions and other pressures on such a country are likely to make membership in the EMU irreversible unless there is widespread economic dislocation in Europe or, more generally, a collapse of peaceful coexistence within Europe.

In the end, the desirability of a European monetary union will be judged not by its impact on inflation and unemployment but by its effect on peace and conflict within Europe and with the rest of the world. A united Europe of more than 300 million people with a single foreign and military policy would be a formidable participant in the global balance of power of the twenty-first century, capable of projecting force and forming important strategic alliances. Only time would tell whether the creation of such a global power would be a stabilizing or destabilizing influence on world peace.»

 

Une partie intéressante du papier traite aussi de “Les préférences majoritaires et les élites politiques”, l’auteur y développe des éléments d’analyse qui sont encore d’une grande actualité (M. Feldstein (1997), p. 31):

“Majority Preferences and Political Elites

(…) The government leaders of most of the European Union countries have strongly urged their citizens to support European monetary union. They have, moreover, frequently been joined in this effort by the leaders of the opposition parties. Nevertheless, the majority of the public in many countries remains unconvinced. In Germany, polls indicate that as many as two-thirds of the voters oppose German participation in the EMU. In France, a plebiscite approved monetary union with a majority of less than 1 percent despite the strong endorsement of the then President Francois Mitterand and by the leader of the opposition party; a similar vote today might well show a majority opposed to EMU. 

It is impossible to know why politicians are disregarding the popular sentiment. They may feel that EMU is really in the public’s best interest, but that the issues are too complex for the public to understand. Alternatively, they may believe that public opposition is excessively influenced by the temporary increase in unemployment that has resulted from pursuing the convergence criteria that are required for admission to EMU. More generally, they may believe that although the current generation will be hurt byjoining the EMU, the gains to future generations outweigh the losses to the current generation. Or they may be influenced by the way that the decision about EMU will affect themselves personally.(…)

Dans le vocabulaire contemporain on parlerait de “conflits d’intérêts”

 

Martin Feldstein (1997) “The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4): 23-42 (ici l’article en entier)

 

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